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 Executive Summary 
 
Well-functioning urban land and housing markets are a critical success factors for achieving 
robust economic growth.  This note provides a short overview of urban land and housing market 
performance in Punjab Province of Pakistan.  It describes the characteristics of well-functioning 
urban land and housing markets and argues that, at present, the Punjab’s urban land and housing 
markets are not performing well. The paper identifies a range of structural and institutional 
shortcomings that impede urban land market performance, and then concludes by offering 
recommendations for making land and housing markets function better. 
 
Our review of key performance measures of the Punjab’s urban land and housing markets—
urban land supply, land prices, quality of the housing stock, access to urban services, 
construction costs, private sector participation in real estate development, and levels of 
informality in the housing production sector—indicate that the province’s urban housing markets 
are not efficiently operating.  This Background Study has pinpointed a range of impediments to 
efficient urban land and housing market performance:  excessive public land ownership, 
inadequate infrastructure services, weak property rights, counterproductive urban planning 
policies and regulations, costly subdivision and construction regulations, limited financing for 
property development and acquisition, rent controls and distortive taxation mechanisms. 
 
The study offers a series of recommendations for improving urban land market performance:  
 
1. Build an urban information base and deepen understanding of urban land and property 
market dynamics. 
 
2. Strengthen property rights and improve efficiency of land titling and registration.  
 
3. Reform and restructure systems of local property taxation to reduce distortions and to 
strengthen resource mobilization. 
 
4. Reform urban planning, zoning, subdivision and construction regulations to encourage 
sound economic development of cities and more affordable housing production. 
 
5. Reform rent control.  
 
6. Reduce levels of public land ownership through auctions and use proceeds to finance 
critical infrastructure and engage in a reform of public land development agencies.  
 
7. Increase investment in infrastructure systems and build institutional base for 
economically and financial sustainable system of infrastructure delivery, operations and 
maintenance.   
 
8. Encourage more private sector participation in real estate development and the financing 
of real estate.  
 
 9. Design new institutional frameworks for managing urban development at the local, city 
and metropolitan levels.  
 
As the governments of Pakistan and Punjab focus attention on the looming challenges posed by 
rapid urban development, reform efforts should be closely coordinated at the central, provincial 
and local levels of government.  Governments at all levels should focus on the establishment of 
an enabling environment through strengthening the legal framework, particularly, for property 
rights, modernizing its planning, zoning and construction regulations and approaches, 
withdrawal from direct interventions in the market and facilitating greater involvement of the 
private sector. 
1 
Introduction 
 
1. The Punjab Province in Pakistan is in the midst of a profound urban transition, driven by 
structural economic change. The Punjab is transforming from an agriculturally-based economy to 
a manufacturing and service based economy, which is leading to massive urbanization. This 
transformation is just getting started and will continue over the next decade.  According to the 
World Bank’s Development Data Platform (DDP) database (2006), urban-based manufacturing 
and service sectors composed 77 percent of the Pakistan’s GDP in 2003 and more than 90 
percent of GDP growth during 1999 – 2003.  As the Pakistan economy continues to expand and 
modernize, urbanization should continue at a strong pace over the next 5-10 years. Looking 
forward, one of the Punjab’s key strategic issues is how well its cities function in order to drive 
overall economic growth.  
 
2. Effectively managing the expansion of the Punjab’s system of cities will largely determine 
how well the Punjab navigates this urban-based transition to manufacturing and services. Given 
its rapidity and scale, this expansion poses a major challenge for both Provincial and local 
governments.  While urban population growth averaged 3.4 percent per year between 1981 and 
1998, more recently it has more than doubled to 7 percent per year.  In absolute terms, the 
Punjab’s urban population increased from 12.9 million 1981 to 22.9 million in 1998, and as of 
2001 the Province’s urban population stood at 28 million.  Over the last twenty years, urban 
population growth in cities and urban areas of the Punjab increased by an average of about 
750,000 persons per year.  During the 1998-2001 period the annual average was much higher at 
1.7 million per year.  
 
3. To foster sustainable economic growth and reduce poverty, the Punjab’s main urban centers 
need to accommodate additional urban growth and support economic development.  A critical 
ingredient for success is well-functioning urban land and housing markets, which form the basis 
for both private sector growth and the ability to provide shelter to the population.  
 
4. This background paper reviews and assesses how well the Punjab’s urban land and housing 
markets are functioning.  The evidence suggests that urban land and housing markets are not 
performing as well as they could.  Urban land-use planning and development controls are 
impeding urban development, while land titling and registration systems hamper real estate 
development.  Systems of local resource mobilization and taxation do not generate sufficient 
revenues to fund key urban infrastructure.  The paper notes the several critical negative 
consequences of poor urban land market performance, namely high land and housing prices, 
large and expanding katchi abadi developments, poorly located industrial estates, inadequate 
urban infrastructure, and constrained commercial development.  
 
5. Without effective policy reform, the Punjab’s cities will not expand in step with economic 
and demographic demand, land and housing prices will continue to remain expensive, and 
inefficient and unhealthy informal development will predominate.  Ultimately, unless there is 
change, these urban land and housing market impediments are likely to constrain the Punjab’s 
future economic development.      
 
2 
Setting the Context 
6. The importance of addressing housing and land issues is underlined by at least two factors, 
namely increasing urbanization and economic development. While the pace of urbanization in 
Punjab prior to 1998 has been slower than that in many other developing countries, recent 
population estimates suggest that urban growth in Punjab was double the Pakistan’s average in 
urban areas and more than 5 times the province’s general population growth during 1998-2001 
(Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
Key Demographic Data for Pakistan and Punjab 
  Pakistan Punjab 
Total population    
Million (2001) 134
 a
 76 
Average annual growth 1981-98 2.7% 2.6% 
Average annual growth 1998-2001 0.3%
 a
 1.3% 
Urban population   
Million (2001) 48 28 
% of total (2001) 36% 37% 
Average annual growth 1981-98 3.5% 3.4% 
Average annual growth 1998-2001 3.5% 7.0% 
 
a
 In accordance with the World Bank’s database (DDP) the total population of Pakistan was 141 million in 2001 and 
average annual growth during 1998-2001 was 2.4%. However, in order to compare Punjab with the national 
averages on a consistent basis the Census Organization of Pakistan and Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics data 
were used for calculations in this table. 
Source:
 
Census Organization of Pakistan (1998) and Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics (2001). 
 
7. Prior to 1998 the majority of the urban growth (74 percent) was generated by natural increase 
and only 15 percent was due to rural-urban migration (Hasan 2001). However, the recent jump in 
urban growth may indicate an increasing rural-urban migration or possibly increased 
reclassification of rural areas as urban.  Furthermore, due to the way areas are classified as urban 
or rural, the actual level of both urbanization and its growth in Pakistan may be underestimated.
1
  
For example, the expanding ribbon developments along major transport routes and peri-urban 
areas around cities are still classified as rural even though they have urban characteristics (World 
Bank 2004a). 
 
8. Projections of urbanization indicate massive growth at both the national and provincial level. 
The Ministry of Planning’s Vision 2030 estimates that Pakistan’s total population will reach 218 
million by 2030 and that 60 percent this of the total will be located in urban areas. In absolute 
terms, between 2001 and 2030, Pakistan’s urban population will increase from 48 to 130 million 
persons—an average of 2.8 million person per year.  In the case of the Punjab, urbanization 
trends and projections mirror nationwide patterns. Punjab’s rate of urbanization is anticipated to 
increase from 37 to 60 percent between 2001 and 2030. In terms of absolute increase, between 
                                                 
1
 While official estimates indicate that 36 percent of Pakistan’s population was urban in 2001, Hasan (2001) 
estimates it to exceed 40 percent. 
3 
2001 and 2030 the Punjab’s urban population is likely to increase from 28 million to 74 million, 
which translates into an average increase of 46 million people per year.
2
  
 
9. Much of the urban population growth in the Punjab will be concentrated in the province’s 
five major cities with populations above 1 million: Lahore, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala 
and Multan (Census Organization of Pakistan 1998). 
 
 
Table 2 
Population Trends and Projections, 1981-2005 and 2030, 
(in ‘000s) 
       2005-30 
    %ACGR %ACGR  Ann. Ave. 
City 1981 1998 2005 1981-98 98-2005 2030* Increase 
Lahore 2,953 5,144 6,131 3.3% 2.5% 14,737 344 
Faisalabad 1,104 2,009 2,347 3.6% 2.2% 5,641 132 
Rawalpindi 795 1,410 1,660 3.4% 2.4% 3,990 93 
Multan 732 1,197 1,418 2.9% 2.4% 3,408 80 
Gujranwala 601 1,226 1,442 4.3% 2.3% 3,466 81 
Total of 5 6,185 10,986 12,998 3.4% 2.4% 31,243 730 
Other Urban  6,765 11,874 17,788 3.4% 5.9% 42,757 999 
Punjab Total 12,950 22,860 30,786 3.4% 4.3% 74,000 1,729 
* Based on the Provincial population growth rate of  3.57 percent per year  
Source: Ministry of Planning Vision 2030     
 Government of Punjab Planning and Development Board.    
 
10. Table 2 provides population counts for these cities for 1981, 1998 and 2005, as well as 
projections of populations to 2030, based on national and provincial trends. It illustrates the 
significant historical rates of urban population growth in the main cities and other urban areas of 
the province and provides estimates of projected population to 2030 based on Ministry of 
Planning projections. The total population of the Punjab’s five largest cities will increase from 
13 million in 2005 to 31 million by 2030, implying that the population will increase by 730,000 
annually. Lahore will have the largest share of the increase, with 344,000 persons per year. This 
rapid urban growth poses unprecedented challenges for urban land and housing markets and the 
government’s capacity to provide adequate infrastructure to support growth. 
 
11. As the Punjab’s economic development improves, the demand for housing, industrial, 
commercial and service facilities will also increase (Jiang et al 1998).  This will place 
considerable pressure on land and real estate market as investors search for plant locations. In 
addition, as economic conditions improve, there should be an upturn in the demand for 
residential real estate from workers, expatriate Pakistanis and foreign nationals operating 
businesses in the province.  
 
                                                 
2
 This estimate is based on the “step-down” method of sub-national population projection. It assumes that the 
Punjab’s total population will remain at 57 percent of the nation, and that its urbanization rate will match the 
national level.  
4 
12. The Punjab’s high rates of urban growth combined with the restrictive environment for 
provision of land and housing have resulted in escalating land prices, which drive up the costs of 
infrastructure and urban development projects and they diminish housing affordability. In the 
long run rising land prices drive up labor and business costs, reducing a city’s competitiveness 
(Dowall, 1998).  It has also resulted in deteriorated and low quality infrastructure, large 
slum/squatter population and high household expenditures on housing. 
 
13. Thus, the efficiency of urban land and housing markets can be expected to play an 
increasingly important factor in driving economic development. Attracting foreign direct 
investment, as well as accommodating domestic requires efficient and responsive land and real 
estate markets in Punjabi cities. How well are these markets working at present? The next two 
sections provide answers this question—what are the characteristics of well functioning and 
efficient urban land and housing markets, and what is the on-the-ground experience in Punjabi 
cities?  
  
Characteristics of Well-Functioning Urban Land and Housing Markets
3
 
 
14. Urban land and housing markets should efficiently allocate land and housing resources   
between suppliers and demanders. Housing supply should reasonably match the housing 
demands of households in terms of price, location and quality. For commercial and industrial real 
estate, businesses should be able to acquire or rent facilities, or purchase land for development 
without difficultly and at reasonable occupancy costs. For all classes of real estate there should 
be an inventory of land and properties on the market at any point in time so that buyers have 
alternatives, and sellers face competitive pressures from other sellers.   
 
15. Effective real estate markets also are relatively transparent. Buyers and sellers can readily 
obtain information of the current prices of land, housing and other real estate being offered on 
the market at any time. Typically, real estate brokerage services operating within or across 
markets and provide information prices, supply and demand.  
 
16. In most market economies, private production is the predominant mode of real estate 
development, for residential, commercial and industrial facilities. Furthermore in well 
functioning urban land markets, most land is privately owned—public land ownership is 
limited—usually to less than 5 percent of the market.4 Aside from a few exceptions, public 
provision of housing is miniscule relative to overall production, less than 5 percent. The full 
range of housing supply, including new as well as existing units should provide households with 
affordable options for purchase as well as rental. Well performing housing markets produce 
housing that is priced between 3 and 6 times total household income.  For extremely low income 
households, shelter is typically provided through central and local government agencies, and 
non-profit, non governmental organizations. Depending on household incomes and housing 
                                                 
3
 This section draws on Elliot J Feldman;  Michael A Goldberg. Land rites and wrongs: the management, regulation, 
and use of land in Canada and the United States. Boston OGH, 1988, and Dowall and Clarke, 1995.  
 
4
 Hong Kong and Singapore are notable exceptions.  
5 
prices, the private real estate markets typically produce housing that is affordable to households 
to the 30
th
 to 40
th
 percentile of the income distribution (Dowall, 1982). Households with lower 
incomes, typically rent accommodations, share housing with extended families or they postpone 
forming households. Some are fortunate to get housing assistance from government sources. The 
private production of residential real estate investment should comprise between 5-10 percent of 
GDP.  The level of informal housing occupancy (houses built without approval, title or adequate 
urban infrastructure) should be less than 20 percent of the total housing stock (this is the average 
rate for middle income developing countries).  
 
17. In the case of commercial and industrial properties, businesses should be able to acquire land 
and build facilities or rent space in existing buildings. Opportunities should be varied with 
buyers able to find locations that meet their requirements in terms of access to customers, ease of 
shipping inputs and outputs at affordable occupancy costs. Commercial and industrial real estate 
markets should have vacancy rates of 5-10 percent.  
 
18. The purchase and transfer of land and property should be straightforward, requiring limited 
time (less than 30 days) and the total costs executing a transaction—sale, purchase, exchange 
should comprise less that 5 percent of the value of the property. 
 
The Punjab’s Urban Land and Housing Markets are Not Performing Well 
 
19. Our review of key performance measures of urban land and housing markets—urban land 
supply, land prices, quality of the housing stock, access to urban services, construction costs, 
private sector participation in real estate development, and levels of informality in the housing 
production sector indicate that the Punjab’s urban housing markets are not efficiently operating.   
 
20. The total annual national investment in housing of Rs 150–160 billion (US$ 2.3-2.8 billion) 
contributes less than one percent to the Pakistan’s GDP, which is significantly below the level in 
developed and also in many developing countries.
5
  Also in terms of housing units constructed 
per 1,000 population Pakistan has among the lowest levels in the world – 0.5 units versus the 
average of 6.7 for developed countries and 1.9 for post-soviet countries in 2000. As a result, the 
Government of Punjab estimates that the housing shortage in the province is 2.5 million units,
6
 
while the total annual construction in the whole of Pakistan is only 300,000 units. (Ministry of 
Housing and Works, 2001.) 
 
21. The majority of housing in Pakistan is constructed by individual land owners contracting 
small (and mostly informal) builders. However, the data on value added of the construction 
sector in Pakistan indicate that the government’s share has been steadily increasing from 18 
percent in 1999/2000 to 41 percent in 2002/03 (see Table 3). 
                                                 
5
 Housing construction composed 6% of GDP in Australia and Canada, 3.5% in UK and 4.5% in USA in 2003 
(Berger-Thomson and Ellis 2004), 5% in Korea, 6% in Brazil, 3% in Russia and 1% in India (FIAS 2005b).  Data 
for Pakistan are from World Bank et al (2004a). 
6
 www.punjab.gov.pk/hud/govt_servants_housing_scheme.htm and Dawn 2004. 
6 
Table 3 
Construction in Pakistan 
 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 (P) 
Construction, value added (% of GFCF) 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 
- of which by the private sector 82% 84% 77% 59% 63% 
Construction of residential buildings  
 (% of government’s capital exp.) 
9% 13% 9% N/A N/A 
NOTE: P – projected; GFCF – Gross Fixed Capital Formation. 
Source: DDP. 
 
22. While the number of builders appears to be large, majority of them is informal. Only about 
270 of the 4,000 members of the Pakistan’s Association of Builders and Developers are 
incorporated companies. In order to avoid taxation and scrutiny from the government 
departments communication and contracts between the builders and the consumers are also 
carried out mostly orally. (Aries Group et al, 2004.) However, such a system involves numerous 
risks for both parties and makes attracting formal financing difficult. 
 
23. While some changes have started to take place in the building industry towards greater 
regularization of operations, those are at the very early stages. For example, some developers 
such as Eden Developers Limited, one of the larger builders in Lahore, have obtained credit 
ratings from Pakistan Credit Rating Agency in order to access financing (Aries Group et al, 
2004). Yet access to formal financing is still very limited and available to the top builders and 
buyers in the highest deciles of income distribution. This translates into insufficient supply and 
high costs that only a small portion of the population is able to afford. Thus, the majority resorts 
to gradual and highly informal housing solutions. 
 
Urban land prices and construction costs are high 
 
24. Property prices in the urban areas of Punjab, particularly, Lahore have been increasing 
rapidly during recent years. For example, in Lahore the ratio of the price of 1 kanal area (0.125 
acres) to medium household income increased from 5 in 1998 to 40 in 2004 (Dowall 2004).  At 
the same time as much as 80 percent of formally developed plots in Lahore remain vacant 
(World Bank 2004b).  A recent survey of residential land prices indicates that raw land prices in 
newly developing areas of Lahore, Multan, Faisalabad and Rawalpindi range from Rs 100,000 to 
Rs. 240,000 per marla (25.3 square meters).  This suggests 3 to 5 marla plots (targeted toward 
low and moderate income households) would fetch between Rs. 300,000 to 720,000 for a three 
marla plot and Rs 500,000 to Rs. 1,200,000 for a five marla plot. Pakistan’s GDP per capita 
stands at Rs 132,000, meaning that a three marla plots costs between 2.3 and 5.5 times income 
and a five marla plot costs  between 3.8 and 9 times income.  
 
25. Residential construction costs are also high relative to income. Average quality construction 
costs range between Rs. 600-950 per square foot. A modest dwelling unit of 750 square feet 
would cost between Rs. 450,000 and Rs. 637,500. The ratio of housing cost (plot plus structure) 
to income (cost of the plot and the house) ranges between nearly 6 times income for a basic plot 
and house to 14 times income. These ratios are well above what is found in other countries with 
well functioning real estate markets (see above).  
 
7 
26. As a result urban households spend a high portion of their incomes (34 percent in 2001/02) 
on housing and related services indicating the negative effects of unintended distortions of urban 
policies in Punjab (see Graph 2). Such levels are comparable with those in the US where 
households spend 32 percent on housing.  Furthermore, due to the way the imputed rents are 
calculated by the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics (see note for Graph 2).  housing 
expenditures may actually be underestimated. 
Graph 2 
                  
Housing Related Expenditures in Punjab by Household 
Income Distribution (2001/02)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
Transport 2% 2% 2% 3% 5%
Fuel/lighting 11% 11% 10% 10% 8%
Rent 14% 15% 18% 18% 24%
1 2 3 4 5
 
NOTE: imputed rent is estimated by applying an annual growth of 5.3% since mid 1980s. 
Source: Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics (2001/02). 
 
27. Furthermore housing and housing related expenditures tend to rise at a faster pace than the 
general inflation mostly due to inflation in fuel, lighting, transportation and communication 
costs. 
Graph 3 
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12%
14%
16%
General 13% 11% 12% 8% 6% 4% 4% 3% 3%
Housing Rent 10% 9% 10% 10% 7% 4% 3% 3% 1%
Fuel/Lighting 7% 15% 12% 15% 2% 6% 13% 9% 8%
Transp./Communic. 6% 10% 15% 5% 8% 9% 12% 6% 5%
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 
8 
Source: calculated by author based on Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics (2004) 
 
 
High land and housing prices have driven households into the informal sector  
 
28. About 7.5 million people (35 percent of the Punjab’s urban population) live in slums, with 
another 2.8 million (12 percent) living in katchi abadis (ADB 2003).  However, this may be an 
underestimation due to definition of “katchi abadis” and it is likely that part of squatter 
population is not accounted for.
7
  Even with such a large slum settlements, household 
expenditures on housing are reaching the levels common in developed countries, although 
private construction industry is mostly informal and housing finance is essentially non-existent 
(less than 1 percent of GDP). 
 
29. Formalization of slum and squatter settlements cannot be looked at in isolation from other 
reforms that are the actual causes of the informal housing, i.e. restrictive land and housing 
policies and regulations, distortive taxation, etc.  Furthermore, formalization of slum and squatter 
settlements and the associated increase in property values may displace the poor tenants as 
oftentimes is the case with small scale formalization.  However, when formalization is carried 
out on a broad scale, more poor landlords have the incentives to consolidate and expand, 
ensuring a more elastic supply of rental housing (Galal and Razzaz, 2001).  Thus, achievement of 
desired benefits and more efficient housing and land markets require a comprehensive approach 
to the reforms. 
 
30. A related issue is overcrowding. While data are not sufficient to fully assess the issue of 
overcrowding in Punjab, the average household size in the lower deciles of income distribution 
was almost double that in the higher deciles in 2001/02. This implies that overcrowding may, 
indeed, be an issue at least for the urban poor.  Also, the number of housing units in Punjab 
increased at a lower pace (2 percent per annum) than the population growth during 1980-98, 
while the number of housing units in other provinces increased by 3 percent p.a., which was 
greater than the population growth of 2.6 percent p.a. (World Bank 2004a).  However, incomes 
in the Punjab grew faster than those in other provinces during the same period.  This suggests 
that the number of people per housing unit increased in Punjab, but decreased elsewhere, and 
indicates constraints in the province’s housing market. 
 
Table 4 
Main Characteristics of the Housing Stock in Pakistan and Punjab (1998) 
 Pakistan Punjab 
Total housing (units) 19,211,738 10,537,127 
Urban (units) 6,031,430 3,200,934 
Urban (% of total) 32% 30% 
Persons per housing unit (average) 6.8 6.9 
Urban 7.1 7.2 
Persons per room (average) 3.1 3.0 
Source: Census Organization of Pakistan (1998). 
                                                 
7
 “Katchi abadis” was defined in 1985 as unauthorized settlement on state-owned land of more than 40 dwellings 
(ADB 2003).  Thus, smaller squatter settlements and those on private lands would be excluded. 
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What’s Causing the Poor Performance?  
 
31. There are a range of factors, each working independently and interdependently to stifle urban 
land and housing markets in the Punjab. The supply of serviced land is constrained by 
widespread public ownership of land, inadequate trunk infrastructure provision to developable 
sites, complicated property rights, land titling and registration systems, and inappropriate and 
inefficient land use plans and regulations, rent controls, highly and distorting taxes.  These 
impediments make it difficult for land and housing markets to respond to housing demand and as 
a result land and housing prices are expensive. As a consequence, most households are priced out 
of the formal market and nearly 50 percent of housing is produced through informal procedures 
without infrastructure, titling and planning.   
 
High public land ownership 
 
32. Public land ownership in Punjabi cities is very high. Since partition, government agencies 
have been granted large parcels of land, in large cities, where local development authorities are 
seen as the principal vehicle for residential development, large tracts of land have been 
transferred to these authorities.
8
 Unfortunately, the track record of Development Authorities to 
development residential projects is poor and much of their land is vacant. In Lahore 30 percent 
of land is owned by government, in other large cities it ranges from 20 to 40 percent. Much of 
this land is well located and if it were placed on the market, it could provide opportunities for 
residential, commercial and industrial development. Previous research on Karachi indicates that 
high rates of public land ownership stifle formal urban land market operations, and encourage 
the development of katchi abadis (Dowall, 1991b). 
 
Inadequate trunk infrastructure and services to residential areas 
 
33. Another reason for constrained urban land supply is that most cities are not able to finance 
the construction of infrastructure to support development, and there are enormous backlogs. For 
example, Lahore needs to spend Rs. 55 billion (US $ 0.9 billion) over the next five years to close 
its infrastructure gap. Unfortunately, Lahore’s current annual public spending of Rs 1 billion is 
only a fraction of the need, which is estimated at Rs 11 billion p.a. (Dowall, 2004). 
   
34. Private developers, including housing societies and cooperatives routinely face the problem 
of inadequate availability and/or significant delays in the provision of infrastructure such as 
roads, water, electricity, sewerage and gas by public authorities/agencies (Aries Group et al, 
2004).
9
 This not only increases the costs to developers, but also financial risks of real estate 
projects and limits the availability of financing, particularly, from the formal private lenders. 
Thus, developers (as well as buyers) revert to savings and informal financing, which is broadly 
available, but very costly. Furthermore, regulations require the developers to pay a large portion 
                                                 
8
 Most of the land for housing purposes is developed by Pakistan Housing Authority, PHATA, Defense Housing 
Authorities, Cantonment Boards, city development authorities and trusts. The different authorities provide land with 
infrastructure such as electricity, water and gas, while housing is constructed by the buyers or land recipients. 
9
 Aries Group et al (2004) and FIAS (2005b). 
10 
of infrastructure costs up-front (25 – 50 percent in Lahore10). These factors combined with the 
above discussed distortions and uncertainty in regards of property rights translates into high 
property prices that are affordable only to a small portion of the high income population and 
businesses.  
 
35. Public agencies plan their infrastructure investments based on city master plans, and program 
investments according to plans and not economic reality (i.e. “actual demand”).  Furthermore, 
most infrastructure investments are made and services are provided by central or provincial 
government agencies, including Development Authorities.  There is little role for or coordination 
with the local governments.  Furthermore, due to highly subsidized services and limited financial 
capacity of local governments as discussed above the available funding for any investments is 
very limited and insufficient to meet ever increasing demand.  Majority of local government 
budgets (60 – 70 percent) are spent on recurrent expenditures, while annual development 
expenditures in 54 percent of TMAs are below Rs 60 (US$ 1) per capita.  
 
36. As a result, businesses and developers face major difficulties in getting connections to 
utilities, particularly, gas and electricity, which typically delays large-scale construction projects 
by about 12 months and entails significant amounts in bribes (FIAS, 2005b). The consequences 
of inadequate infrastructure provision are staggering--only 58 percent of the urban housing units 
in Punjab had connection to the piped drinking water in 1998. versus 76 percent of the 
province’s general population and 65 percent average in Pakistan.  Furthermore, there are great 
disparities among the districts and TMAs in Punjab – connections to piped water and 
drainage/sewerage coverage varied from 7 to 100 percent and from 29 to 100 percent 
respectively. (see The  level of metering of utility consumption is also very low.  Even in Lahore 
only 30 percent of water connections are metered (LDA 2004). 
 
Graph 4 
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37. Water and sewerage services in Punjab are not reliable, nor are they sustainable. In major 
urban centers of Pakistan a typical daily service of water supply is 9 – 10 hours and service 
coverage is 32 percent (Ministry of Water and Power of Pakistan, 2002).  At the same time waste 
water, including from industrial consumers, is disposed of without treatment creating an 
increased risk to environmental and water pollution.
11
 
 
38. Low cost recovery exacerbates the situation further.  Due to the segregated and unclear 
institutional and organization framework for service provision, investments are carried out in a 
piecemeal fashion rather than large scale or TMA-wide investments in trunk infrastructure and 
expansion of services.   
 
39. The Ministry of Water and Power of Pakistan (2002) has recognized the worrying situation in 
the quality of water in Punjab and the whole country. Drinking water in major urban centres of 
the Punjab seldom meets WHO Guidelines. Water samples from Lahore, Rawalpindi and 
Islamabad have been determined to be unfit for human consumption due to fecal contamination. 
High concentrations of nitrates have also been detected in drinking waters in Rawalpindi as well 
as Islamabad and other cities. Nitrate leaching from heavy fertilizer use is also an issue in 
southern Punjab. Many areas near Lahore have water with very high fluoride content resulting in 
different ailments of the consumers. 
 
40. Most businesses use their own water sources as municipal water supply to industries is 
estimated at 2 percent of the annual consumption by the manufacturers of the major products (29 
million m
3
 versus 1.5 billion m
3
).  The industrial demand is expected to increase even further and 
reach 1.8 billion m
3
 by 2011 and 2.3 billion m
3
 by 2025. (Ministry of Water and Power of 
Pakistan, 2002) 
 
41. Similar situation is observed in solid waste management. In Lahore solid waste collection is 
estimated by LDA (2004) to be about 70 percent. There are no sanitary landfills in Punjab and 
the dumping grounds are not entirely legal. (World Bank, 2004a).   
 
Weak property rights and ineffective land titling and registration systems 
 
42. Another constraint of land supply is caused by inefficient mechanisms for registering 
property transactions. While registration of property in Pakistan appears to be rather efficient and 
comparable to other countries
12
, it does not guarantee effective title and enforcement of property 
rights.  Incentives for property registration in Pakistan are very weak and procedures have 
numerous loopholes as documented in World Bank et al (2004a) and Aries Group et al (2004). 
For example, Pakistan law does not envisage the provision of title certificate by the government. 
The records rather indicate the person responsible for paying property related taxes who is 
therein presumed to be the owner. However, such ownership documents have been questioned in 
numerous court cases. The law also allows for optional registration of land or change of 
ownership is also in some cases. For instance, under Islamic Law oral declarations of gift do not 
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 World Bank (2004a) and Ministry of Water and Power of Pakistan (2002). 
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 In accordance with Doing Business database it requires 4-5 procedures and 49 days to register a property in 
Pakistan costing equivalent of 4.2 percent of the property value versus 4 procedures, 34 days and 4.8 percent 
average in OECD countries (http://www.doingbusiness.org/Default.aspx). 
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have to be registered. Thus, the system of law allows for legally valid titles to be created without 
recorded transactions. 
 
43. The situation is further complicated by benami (documented, but unrecorded) transactions.13 
Benami transactions are legally protected in Pakistan under Benami Act and allow the parties to 
circumvent taxation and restrictions on maximum area of landholding. The elimination of 
benami transactions has been recommended among other things by the Word Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (World Bank et al, 2004). 
 
44. Recent studies in Pakistan14 indicate a number of other issues impeding the development of 
effective and reliable property records such as institutional fragmentation among the numerous 
record keeping entities, inconsistencies in record-keeping methodologies, rules and procedures 
among and within jurisdictions, lack of security checks and difficult reconstitution of chains of 
titles.  There are a number of different agencies keeping records related to property rights, 
including Land Registrar, Revenue and Excise Departments as well as local Development 
Authority, Municipal Corporations, Cantonment Boards and other. (World Bank, 2005b).  
Furthermore, most records are kept manually.  
 
45. The above situation leads to property records being highly incomplete and unreliable. It is 
estimated that there are over a million land-related disputes pending court resolution in Pakistan 
composing 40 percent of all court disputes (FIAS, 2005b).  Thus, court proceedings take years to 
resolve. 
 
46. Experience in many countries also shows that establishment of clear property titles has great 
potential benefits. Residential plots with clear titles in Jakarta sold at a 45 percent premium over 
comparable plots without a clear title
15
. The risk of eviction lowered the value of housing units in 
Manila by 25 percent.
16
  Titling resulted in property value increases in Davao (the Philippines) 
and barrios of Quito (Equador) by 58 percent and 21 percent respectively.
17
 Such benefits are, of 
course, highly dependant on specific characteristics of the housing and land market such as 
actual threats of eviction in informal settlements, availability of credit and level of distortion of 
related prices, e.g. rent controls, subsidies and differentiated taxation based on the land use 
(agriculture / commercial / residential / rental, etc.). 
 
47. Indeed, a recent survey of more than 700 firms throughout Pakistan18 revealed that land 
market issues are the most important barrier to investment in Pakistan.  79 percent of respondents 
identified land acquisition and site development regulations as a barrier and 54 percent of them 
considered it to be severe. Land acquisition on average required 140 days and 20 different 
documents in the case of government land and 64 days and 10 documents in the case of private 
land. Furthermore, 53-55 percent of the respondents reported paying bribes to expedite the 
process for acquisition of land or leasehold rights.   
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 World Bank (2002b), World Bank et al (2004) and Mahmood (2004). 
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 Aries Group et al (2004) and FIAS (2005b). 
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 Dowall and Leaf (1991) as cited in Dowall and Clark (1996). 
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 Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo (1988) as cited in Dowall and Clarke (1996). 
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 Jimenez (1984 and 1988) and Simon (1995) respectively as cited in Galal and Razzaz (2001). 
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48. Finally, unclear property rights in Pakistan have resulted in mortgage finance being limited 
only to the larger urban areas and upper income groups. The unclear property rights in 
combination with other restrictive policies discussed in this section also stifle the supply of 
housing and land, which is particularly important in an environment of a rapid urban expansion. 
 
Counterproductive urban planning and development regulations 
 
49. Urban planning practices and associated regulations also limit the supply of urban land. 
Planners seem more interested in controlling urban growth than in framing plans and strategies to 
accommodate growth and promote economic development (World Bank, 2004a). An example of 
this is the recently completed Integrated Master Plan for Lahore (IMPL). A review of the plan by 
the World Bank (2004b) revealed that, while IMPL is very comprehensive, it does not have a 
strong strategic orientation or clear vision for the future development of the city based on a 
consensus among the stakeholders.
 
 Furthermore, the plan is based on rather basic assumptions 
and supply driven projections for the need of land, which is very likely to result in misallocation 
of land among the different uses.  However, the need and demand for housing and land are rather 
different concepts. While the need for housing is determined by the number of households, the 
actual demand is determined by the incomes.   
 
50. Contrary to the intention, the proposed zoning and subdivision regulations are more likely to 
reinforce the current trend of low-density ribbon development and land subdivision regulations 
could exacerbate the slow pace of construction in Lahore.  These issues are particularly 
important considering the difficult procedures for the commercialization of residential property 
and rapid urbanization, and are likely to impede the formation and growth of small businesses 
(World Bank, 2004b). 
 
51. In terms of urban land regulations the highly restrictive floor area ratios (FARs) appear to be 
the main constraint limiting the density of urban development. In Lahore FAR is set uniformly 
low at 1:1.5. However, in some areas (for multi-storey buildings and along major routes) the 
ratio is set at 1:4 (World Bank, 2004b). In contrast, FARs in center business districts (CBDs) of 
most large cities in other countries are set at much higher levels of 5 – 15 (Bertaud 2002). 
 
52. These restrictive FARs are producing striking anomalies. An analysis of Lahore indicates 
that its density has a “U” shape. It indicates high density in the city center and periphery 
implying significant inefficiencies for businesses, transport and infrastructure development. In 
contrast, density profiles in cities of most developed as well as developing countries is 
exponentially negatively sloped indicating decreasing density with increase in a distance from 
CBD—for example Los Angeles, New York, Paris, Barcelona, Beijing, Bangkok and other) 
(Bertaud 2004).  
 
53. An FAR set significantly below the level of its market equilibrium has a number of negative 
consequences and imposes large costs on the city’s economy. It increases the demand for land 
across the city as more land is required for the same amount of floor space. (World Bank, 
2004b.)  A paper by Ohls, Weisberg and White (1974) showed that zoning regulations restricting 
the supply of land available for development below the level that would be normally exchanged 
14 
in the market increase land prices. A model developed by Lin, Mai and Wang (2003) 
demonstrates how a uniform restriction on the FAR encourages non-productive use of housing 
capital, raises equilibrium housing prices and lowers city growth. In contrast, an increasing FAR 
towards the city center increases the productive use of housing capital and reduces housing 
prices, thus, fostering the city’s economic growth. Low FARs also cause greater dispersion of 
economic activity and housing reducing the benefits of agglomeration effects
19
 and requiring 
lengthier trips.  This finding is supported by Bertaud and Brueckner (2003) who estimated that 
the costs associated with low FARs in Bangalore (India) may be as high as 3 – 6 percent of 
household wealth. 
 
54. Furthermore, low FARs limit the quantity of available formal housing within the city’s 
boundaries.  This results in greater population densities in any given location within the city as 
well as contributes to escalating land and housing prices as already experienced in Lahore. As a 
result, the poor and lower income households are priced out of the market.  In less restricted real 
estate markets private developers are able to adjust to the increasing demographic and economic 
pressures and rising land and construction prices.  For example, Dowall (1992) documents that 
developers in Bangkok increased the density of housing projects during 1974-1988, the period of 
rapid urban growth and increasing land and housing construction prices.  The average number of 
units per hectare increased from 35 to 56 and multi-family housing increased from less than 2 
percent of the new construction in 1986 to 43 percent in 1990.  Such shifts in developer 
operations made housing more affordable. As a result private sector low cost housing was priced 
below many housing units provided by the National Housing Authority (Dowall, 1992).  
Furthermore, during 1986-1990 almost half of the increase in the housing stock was produced by 
private developers, while informally produced housing in Bangkok composed mere 3 percent of 
the total.  In contrast, informally produced housing in cities with highly constrained land markets 
composed 20-80 percent of the total.
20
   
 
55. The experience in Seoul in 1970s and 1980s, on the other hand, demonstrated how highly 
restrictive land regulations contributed to rapidly increasing residential prices under similar 
growth pressures. Such regulations included zoning controls for land use, restrictions on 
conversion of agricultural land and greenbelt policy that reduced the developable land in the 
Seoul metropolitan area by 50 percent. (Dowall and Clark, 1996 and Dowall, 1998.) The 
research indicates that such growth binding regulations are particularly regressive in welfare 
terms (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002a). Site planning and subdivision controls reduced the area 
of land available for residential construction in Seoul by another 40 percent. At the same time the 
low FARs of 1.25 to 1.0 restricted the possibility to compensate the shortage of land with the 
height of buildings. All these factors contributed to the exorbitant 24 percent annual increase in 
land prices during 1974-1989. (Dowall and Clark, 1996 and Dowall, 1998.) 
 
56. Low FARs have other negative effects such as lower incentives to invest in development and 
redevelopment of available land as discussed by Bertaud and Brueckner (2003) and reduced 
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during 1980-1988, and 80 percent in Addis Ababa during 1984-1995 (Dowall 1998). 
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residential mobility. Restricted mobility affects those in the lower deciles of income distribution 
the most as their access to jobs is reduced due to increased transportation time and costs. If the 
minimum land consumption is not limited or is set sufficiently low, the low-income households 
could afford to locate anywhere in the city. However, when regulations impose low density the 
minimum amount of land required for a unit of floor space is usually above the affordability 
level of the poor.  Thus, they are forced to locate further away from CBD and, consequently, 
from the job markets. As a result, the combination of such restrictions with the increasing costs 
of land and urbanization cause segregation of the poor. A greater number of people are forced to 
choose illegal housing and business space arrangements and sacrifice the level of living and 
work conditions. The above restrictions have even further negative effects on the environment 
due to greater pollution and need to convert more agricultural land to urban use to accommodate 
the artificially created excessive need for urban land.
21
 
 
57. The magnitude of the above phenomena indicates that there are some important structural 
and regulatory constraints that affect housing and land markets in Punjab. To understand the 
underlying factors and possible causes of the above phenomena the paper reviews the available 
information in the key areas related to urban housing and land markets in the province – socio-
economic context, regulatory framework, urban planning, provision of infrastructure and 
government programs and subsidies. Thereafter, the effects of this environment on the housing 
and land markets are discussed. 
 
58. For example, Malpezzi and Ball (1991) showed that there is a positive correlation between 
the general distortions in a country’s economy and house price to income ratios in developing 
countries, i.e. the larger the distortions, the higher the house price to income ratios. Empirical 
evidence also demonstrates that land markets are rather efficient in capitalizing the impacts of 
regulation, local public goods, amenities and tax policy, i.e. any discounts (premiums) for 
restrictive (beneficial) policies and regulations are to a great extent included in the market prices 
of land.
22
   
 
59. Dowall (1995) provides an extensive overview of the effects of government housing and land 
policies on the property prices in different countries. For example, in UK before regulations 
began to constrain land supply in the late 1940s there was no apparent trend in real land prices 
for housing (they even seemed to be falling rather than rising) despite the increase in the number 
of households and real incomes.  However, during 1955-2002, when the effects of regulations on 
the new construction started to become more apparent, the real price of residential land increased 
by a factor of 11.  In contrast, the real house prices increased by only 3.4 times over the same 
period (Cheshire and Sheppard 2004). 
 
60. In Malaysia the annual costs of inappropriate land-use and housing development regulations 
were estimated to amount to 3 percent of GDP in the 1980s (World Bank 1989a). In Seoul 
(South  Korea) site planning regulations, subdivision controls (i.e. setbacks, plot and street 
widths and lengths, etc.), floor area ratio (FAR) limits and building codes resulted in a built-up 
area to land ratio of 0.56 in late 1980s (Dowall and Clark 1996). In an environment of rapid 
                                                 
21
 For discussion on these effects see work by Alain Bertaud - http://alain-bertaud.com/ 
22
 Foe more detail see Thorsnes (2000), Hilber and Mayer (2001), Ihlanfeldt and Shayghnessy (2004), Cheshire and 
Sheppard (1995, 2002b), Gibbons (2002), and Cheshire and Sheppard (2004). 
16 
growth such restrictions fueled land price escalation averaging 24 percent p.a. in Seoul during 
1974-1989 (Kim 1991).  Contrary to Seoul, more liberal land and building regulations in 
Bangkok (Thailand) and Bogota (Colombia) allowed developers adjust construction densities 
under increasing demand and cost pressures (Dowall and Clark 1996). 
 
61. In an environment where developers and households can not adjust construction densities, 
i.e. increase built-up area relative to the underlying land plot, more people resort to informal 
solutions.  For example, in Karachi in 1988, the average price of a house in a planned housing 
estate was equivalent to 8 times the average annual income of low income households. Thus, 
families resorted to informal housing in katchi abadis at a quarter of the cost of planned housing 
(Dowall 1991a). 
 
62. While government interventions such as land regulations, property rights, taxation and 
infrastructure investments are necessary, they can become serious obstacles to development of 
cities when designed poorly.  In choosing the level of regulatory intensity the government 
implicitly determines the characteristics of the consumers it wishes to attract (Thorsnes 2000.)  
The critical issues are ensuring balance between the government control and market discretion 
and the benefits of regulations and the costs of compliance.   
Subdivision and construction standards  
 
63. Established minimum construction standards affect affordability and implicitly establish the 
“minimum income” for formal housing and land owners / residents as well.  For example, in 
Jakarta (Indonesia) the minimum land plot size, planned population densities (similar to FARs) 
and restrictive zoning that had little relationship with the market trends were estimated to make 
land affordable to only 5 percent of the urban population (Bertaud 1989).  
 
64. There has been no recent study of the housing standards in Pakistan or Punjab. However, one 
of the main conclusions of the World Bank’s Shelter Sector Review in Pakistan in 1989 was that 
the housing standards at the time had resulted in over-designed and, hence, unaffordable housing. 
The current guidelines for private housing schemes issued by the LDA and Punjab Housing and 
Physical Planning Department stipulate requirements for land distribution that are also likely to 
result in over-designed and expensive housing projects. For example, all private housing 
schemes are required to have a minimum size of 160 kanals (20 acres), 20 percent of which is to 
be pledged with the authority as a guarantee of completion of the scheme (FIAS, 2005b). In 
addition, subdivision regulations require that approximately 50 percent of the gross land area of 
the project be set aside for public uses—circulation, public facilities, parks, etc. A more common 
and reasonable ratio would be about 30 percent. The maximum ceiling for commercial land is set 
at a mere 2 percent.
23
 Similarly, only 2-3 percent of land in a typical government land 
development scheme is allocated for commercial properties. Overall these requirements create 
perverse incentives for private developers and make it very difficult for them to produce 
affordable housing (for example that can only sell 50 percent of the land that they have 
acquired).  
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65. The large minimum size of a housing project forces new residential developments further and 
further away from a city center as land plots available for construction tend to be smaller towards 
the center of a city. Furthermore, large project sizes exclude smaller developers from the formal 
market, thus, reducing competition, particularly, in the lower-end market. The 2 percent limit for 
commercial property also limits the availability of new space for businesses. As a result, it is not 
surprising that the economic development and increasing demand for commercial land translates 
into skyrocketing prices due to highly inelastic supply. In addition, most poor live in the areas of 
their employment due to the fact that they can not afford the costs of daily transportation. Thus, 
segregation of residential and commercial areas and allocation of such a small portion of land for 
commercial purposes work contrary to pro-poor policies and force people to resort to informal 
arrangements either for housing or for employment. 
Limited Formal Property Finance 
66. Another impediment to affordable housing production is that housing finance is very limited 
in Pakistan, compared to other developing countries in the region and around the world. The 
outstanding housing loans amounted to US$ 0.4 billion or 0.6 percent of GDP as of December 
31, 2003, which is among the lowest levels in the world. (Aries Group et al, 2004 and World 
Bank, 2002a.) Even at its peak the annual flow of loans from formal financial institutions 
reached only 1.5 percent of the total housing investment as compared to 25 percent in South East 
Asia and 50 percent in the United States. (D’Souza, 2003.) 
Table 5. 
Outstanding Housing Loans as of December 31, 2003, for Pakistan 
 Rs million US$ million 
Construction 17,336 288.9 
Purchase 4,482 74.7 
Renovation 883 14.7 
Total 22,700 378.3 
Sources: Aries Group et al (2004). 
 
67. The major lender for housing in Pakistan is the House Building Finance Corporation (HBFC) 
– a non-banking institution that accounted for 80 percent of the total formal housing loans (Rs 30 
billion / US$ 0.5 billion) in 2004.  However, recently the banking institutions have been 
increasing their lending for housing and Citibank and ABN AMRO Bank were the biggest loan 
originators in terms of annual flows (about Rs 1 billion / US$ 17 million a year each) (Aries 
Group et al, 2004). 
 
68. The main reason for the limited availability of housing finance is the weak enforcement of 
lenders’ rights (mortgage / property rights) and foreclosure laws.24 Funding does not appear to be 
an immediate issue due to the recently increased liquidity of the financial sector. (World Bank, 
2003b.) However, access to long term resources by mortgage lenders is necessary for the longer 
term development of mortgage lending. 
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 For more details see World Bank et al (2004) and Aries Group et al (2003). 
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69. In order to address this situation the Government has undertaken a number of steps as 
outlined in FIAS (2005b) and Aries Group et al (2004). The State Bank of Pakistan appointed an 
advisory group comprising housing and finance experts to advise the government on measures 
that would promote the development of housing and housing finance markets. The Financial 
Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance of 2001 streamlined the foreclosure process by 
allowing financial institutions to repossess property without court decision. However, this 
procedure is currently undergoing an ultimate test as two recent cases have been taken to the 
superior court.  Furthermore, it may take some time for the lenders and borrowers to accept the 
new procedure as a general industry practice.  
 
70. The credit regime for housing finance was also recently liberalized by raising the limits for 
the bank exposure to the housing sector from 5 to 10 percent of their portfolios, increasing the 
maximum loan to value ratio to 80 percent, increasing loan limits to Rs 5 million (US$ 83,333) 
for individuals and Rs 7.5 million (US$ 125,000) for groups and extending the maximum loan 
term from 15 to 20 years. 
 
71. The combination of a recent stabilization in the country’s economy, the government steps 
towards liberalization of the financial markets and the strengthening of lenders’ rights are 
gradually changing the environment for lending. The results are falling interest rates and 
increasing affordability of housing loans. For instance, interest rates on housing loans fell from 
14 percent in 2002 to about 10 percent at the end of 2003 (World Bank, 2003b), although they 
have been rising again during 2005 (FIAS, 2005b).  However, broad access to formal financial 
markets to the majority of the population will require addressing the underlying sector 
constraints such as strengthening of property rights and streamlining housing and land market 
operations. 
Rent Control 
 
72. Rent control thwarts the construction of new rental apartments and stifles the maintenance of 
existing units. The current rent control legislation (Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance of 
1959) provides extensive tenant protection for residential and non-residential property and land, 
which combined with higher taxation rates for rental units discourage investment in rental 
property. 
 
73. The law in general provides for no rent increase for a 3 year period.  In the case of land and 
residential premises rent can be increased during the 3 year period only, if some addition, 
improvement or alteration to the property has been made by the landlord at the request of the 
tenant.  For non-residential premises the law allows for an automatic increase in rent by 25 
percent every 3 years.  As inflation has dropped below 10 percent in Pakistan since 1997, such 
an increase compensates for at least a general increase in prices although it does not take into 
consideration the trends in property market.  However, throughout most of the 1990s, three year 
inflation was much higher – 29-38 percent. 
  
74. In the case of tax increases, the landlord may charge the tenant only half of such increase and 
only upon the approval by the Controller.  The Controller is a judicial officer appointed by the 
Provincial Government who has a sole authority to determine the fair rent for land and 
19 
residential premises, fairness of eviction, building maintenance, conversion of residential 
building into non-residential, etc.
 25
 
 
75. Eviction is possible in the case of non-payment within 15 days in the case of written contract 
and 60 days in the case of no written contract.  However, in the case of new construction or 
major renovation the previous tenants have the first right to a rental space of up to the same size 
in the new building at a fair rent as determined by the Controller.
26
 
 
76. While rent control legislation exists in many developed as well as developing countries27 and 
has been studied rather extensively, it still remains a controversial issue.  Studies in Cairo 
(Egypt), Kumasi (Ghana) and Mexico City (Mexico) revealed that effective rent controls had, 
indeed, helped the tenants who had stayed in the same property over time (Malpezzi and Ball, 
1991).  In Chile rent controls had lead to a sale of rental houses and apartments to tenants at 
attractive prices (UN-HABITAT 1989).   
 
77. However, there appears to be a much greater evidence of the negative effects of the rent 
control on housing quantity and quality and residential mobility, particularly, in the long term. 
 
78. Reduced housing quantity and quality. The negative effects of rent controls on the investment 
in rental housing and shifting property to other uses (i.e. commercial / office / owner occupied) 
have been extensively documented.
28
  For example, rental housing in Cambridge and Brookline 
(Massachusetts, USA) in 1980s and Berkeley and Santa Monica (California, USA) during 1978-
1990 decreased by 8 – 14 percent after the introduction of stringent rent controls.  At the same 
time rental housing in most nearby locations rose during the same periods of time. In UK, where 
rent control was introduced in 1947, the share of private rental units dropped from 53 percent in 
1950 to less than 8 percent in 1986. (NMHC, 1996) 
 
79. Furthermore, it has been found that tenants receive only part of the benefits of the rent 
control as landlords tend to reduce investment in the property’s maintenance. A study by the 
Rand Corporation of Los Angeles’ rent control law29 found that 63 percent of the benefit of 
lower rents were offset by losses due to the deterioration of the housing unit.  A study in New 
York (Pollakowski, 1999) found that regulated housing had much higher incidence of 
deficiencies than unregulated housing despite significant tax benefits provided to rent controlled 
landlords. 
 
80. Based on such findings, it is not surprising that the urban rental market in Punjab is rather 
small and composes an estimated 20 percent of the total.  In contrast, rental housing in Islamabad 
with less restrictive tenant laws composes 40 percent, which is more in line with that in OECD 
countries.
30
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81. Besides discouraging the supply of rental units such restrictive legislation contributes to a 
decrease in overall housing supply as it discourages redevelopment and renovation.  Buildings, 
which are under rent control, can not be redeveloped or even renovated until the tenants move 
voluntarily out of the building. Thus, oftentimes city development bypasses the areas under rent 
control, which essentially become a form of “frozen” land (Bertaud 2002). In the extreme case of 
Mexico City the rent controls in late 1980s resulted in land plots that had rent controlled property 
being valued less than a vacant plot and the only way to evict tenants was to collapse the 
building (UN-HABITAT 1989). 
 
82.  Rent control to a greater or lesser extent is usually imposed as a blanket measure, which is 
also the case in Punjab. Therefore, the benefits are distributed to the general population rather 
than targeted to the poor and vulnerable.  Thus, there is a significant leakage of benefits to the 
higher income residents.  Although rent control is intended to help the poor, oftentimes it does 
not as most of the poor in developing countries live in informal settlements that are not covered 
under the rent control and/or are not familiar with the rent control legislation.
31
 
 
83. A household survey in Pune (India) in 2002 revealed that 35 – 40 percent of rent control 
benefits occurred to the households in the top 40 percent of income distribution (Hammam and 
Lall, 2005).  In New York City as much as 70 percent of the rent control benefits went to tenants 
residing in affluent neighborhoods and rent-controlled households with incomes greater than 
US$ 75,000 received nearly twice the average subsidy of households with incomes below US$ 
10,000 (Pollakowski 1997). Similarly, residents of rent-controlled housing in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, had higher incomes on average than other residents of the city, including 
homeowners (NMHC 1996).   
 
84. The poor as well as young households oftentimes face additional barriers to rent controlled 
housing through high entry costs.  Rent control tends to foster the development of illegal rental 
market, “insider market” (i.e. rental units are passed among friends or family members) and 
emergence of alternative forms of payments such as key money, advance payments and finder’s 
fees.  Such phenomena are observed not only in developing, but also developed countries. 
(NMHC 1996.) Thus, the rent control policy may actually result in hurting those that it intends to 
protect most. 
 
85. Due to the fact that rent control benefits are tied to the property rather than the individual, 
households tend to stay in the same property for long periods of time even when the location of 
jobs or other factors in the household situation change.  For example, Pollakowski (1999) found 
that rent control in New York City more than doubled the expected duration of residence. This 
not only reduces the mobility of the labor markets, but also increases traffic congestion as 
families are willing to make longer trips to their places of work to keep the rental benefits. 
 
86. Reforming rent control may require a gradual process as abrupt elimination may result in 
immediate shock that would hurt those in the lower deciles of income distribution most and may 
prove difficult to implement from the perspective of political economy. Furthermore, oftentimes, 
including the case in Punjab, rent control is only one of the several and not the most important 
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 A study in Bogota (Columbia) found that only 17% of tenants in illegal settlements had a written contract and 
only 25% of landlords and 20% of tenants understood the rental legislation (UN-HABITAT, 1989). 
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factors causing shortages of developed land and discouraging investment in housing.
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Nevertheless there are significant gains to be obtained through deregulation.  For example, 
Pollakowski (2003) estimated that 8 – 29 percent of investment in formerly rent controlled 
buildings in Cambridge (Massachusetts, USA) was due to elimination of rent control in 1994. 
 
Distortive Taxation 
 
87. Property taxes are important revenue sources for local governments in most developed and 
many developing countries. However, in Punjab the median share of property taxes in the total 
revenues of the five largest cities (Gujranwala, Multan, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Faisalabad) was 
4 percent in 2002/03, which is significantly below the 17 percent median for the large cities in 
other developing countries.  Low levels of property tax revenues mostly stem from significant 
tax exemptions, the linkage of property taxes to the property’s rental rather than market value 
and poor collection.  A World Bank (2004b) assessment indicates that the exemption of 
properties of less than 5 marla (1,300 sq.ft.) in katchi abadis, or in the lowest three levels of the 
property tax schedule (Zones D-G), is estimated to reduce property tax revenues by as much as 
25 percent in Lahore.  
 
88. Due to the stringent rent control legislation the rental value of property is also much lower 
than its market-based rental value would be, resulting in lower property taxes.  The capital value 
is one instrument which is by and large, though not 100%, neutral from the rent control.  
Preliminary analysis (World Bank 2004b) of the assessment system used in Lahore and other 
cities indicates that four to five fold increases in property tax revenue is possible by de-linking 
property taxes from rental values.  In addition, collection efficiency also appears to be low in 
Punjab, as Lahore collected about half of the amount due to it in the form of property tax.    
 
89. Given the limited revenue generating capacity of the property taxes, it is not surprising that 
stamp duties have become the main revenue source for local governments.  In the five largest 
cities of Punjab the majority of tax revenues (87 percent in 2002/03) came from the stamp duty 
on property transfers (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6 
Share of Property Taxes in Local Government Revenues in Selected Cities of Punjab 
 Property tax as % of Property transfer tax (stamp duty) as 
% of 
  total taxes total revenue Total taxes total revenue 
City 2001/02 2002/03 2001/02 2002/03 2001/02 2002/03 2001/02 2002/03 
Gujranwalla 43% 38% 6% 5% 57% 62% 7% 9% 
Faisalabad 66% 36% 7% 4% 32% 61% 3% 6% 
Multan 25% 4% 4% 2% 73% 96% 11% 55% 
Rawalpindi 58% 4% 10% 0% 39% 91% 7% 6% 
Lahore 21% 12% 8% 4% 79% 87% 29% 27% 
Median 43% 12% 7% 4% 57% 87% 7% 9% 
Source: TMA database. 
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90. Reform of property taxation towards more value based tax system would not only generate 
more revenue for the local governments, but also align the interests of the local governments 
with those of the business development as increase in the property values would result in an 
increase in the government’s revenue.   
 
91. Due to their significant role in local finances, reforming stamp duties is also not a 
straightforward and easy task.  Nevertheless, Punjab government has made significant 
improvements in this regard and has reduced its stamp duties from 9 to 5 percent, and fees from 
3 to 0.5 percent in 2003 (see Table 7).   
 
Table 7 
Stamp Duties and Registration Fees in Punjab (2001) 
   Stamp duty Registration fee Total 
SALE  
Agricultural land 4% 1% 5% 
Urban immovable property 5% Rs 50* 5% + Rs 50 
Other cases than urban property 4% 1% 5% 
EXCHANGE  
Agricultural land n/a 1%  
Urban immovable property  5% Rs.50 5% + Rs 50 
Other cases than urban property  4% 1% 5% 
LEASE     
Of immovable property (2004) 
a
 3% 1%** 4% 
GIFT  
Agricultural land 4% 1% 5% 
Agricultural land in favor of 
legal heirs 
2% 1% 3% 
Other cases than Urban property 4% 1% 5% 
Urban immovable property in 
favor of legal heirs 
3% 1% 4% 
Other cases than urban property 4% 1% 5% 
MORTGAGE 
Mortgage deed (2003) 
b
  0.25%  
* registration fee is 1% (World Bank et al 2004). 
** in accordance with Revenue Department, Government of Punjab (2001) registration fee was 5/8 of the value of 
stamp duty (equivalent to 1.875%) in 2001. 
a
 World Bank (2004a), 
b
 Aries Group et al (2004). 
Source: Revenue Department, Government of Punjab (2001). 
 
92. High stamp duties discourage registration of real estate transactions or reporting their true 
values, thus, also restricting the full use of the property value. For example, an internally 
conducted survey by HBFC in 2003 found that 50 percent of property owners own their real 
estate on the basis of Power of Attorney to avoid high taxation. This also negatively affects 
government revenues not only from stamp duties, but also from other taxes such as income, sales 
and property taxes (World Bank 2004a).  In contrast, the initial experience in India (Maharashtra, 
23 
Punjab, West Bengal), as well as Pakistan, indicates that lowering stamp duties results in 
increased rather than decreased government tax revenue.
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93. The proposed Punjab Finance Bill for 2004 provided for further reduction in stamp duty on 
property transactions to 2 percent.
34
  While this would bring Punjab more in line with the other 
provinces of Pakistan, it still high relative to other countries such as China, Philippines and 
Singapore.
35
  Other fees are also levied in Punjab, such as those on the registration of rental 
contracts and change of property use. For example, land commercialization fee is set at 20 
percent of the value of the land.
36
 
 
94. Due to low tax revenue the governments have limited resources for provision of 
infrastructure and services. It has adverse effects on the quality of services and consequently 
residents’ willingness to pay not only service changes, but taxes in general. Thus, distortive 
taxation policy leads to a vicious circle. 
 
95. As the national government has started to realize the negative implications of its tax policies, 
it has envisaged significant reductions in stamp duties and fees in the NHP.  The government has 
also established a committee comprising federal and provincial officials to examine the 
provincial tax regimes and prepare recommendations for their rationalization and reform.  
Complex Institutional Framework  
96. The overall responsibility for planning in Punjab has been assigned to Punjab Housing & 
Town Planning Agency (PHATA), which prepares the provincial land-use plans as well as 
Master Plans, Outline Development Plans, Small Town Development Plans and City 
District/Tehsil/Union Council Plans.
37
 At the same time the Local Government Ordinance of 
2001 (LGO) provides for significant devolution of planning responsibilities to the lower levels of 
the government. Thus, the actual division of functions and responsibilities is not clear. 
 
97. Furthermore, the different levels of local governments are envisaged as independent units 
under the LGO without any hierarchical administrative linkages. Such a segregated system 
results in decisions being made independently by each local government / authority and leads to 
focusing on individual priorities rather than broader systemic infrastructure issues (World Bank 
2004a). 
 
98. This fragmentation is generating two very serious problems: First and foremost, service 
delivery issues across TMAs are ignored.  The TMAs have not yet realized that the province will 
no longer be financing development schemes, so have not adjusted their revenues accordingly.  
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 Alm et al (2004) and Ali (2004) for India and Pakistan respectively. 
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 Daily Times (2004). Information on the actual reduction is not available at the time of this study. 
35
 There is no stamp duty in Islamabad.  Registration fee is Rs 150/sq.yard for the transfer of property, which, 
however, may be quite high depending on the value of property. For example, based on the data in Guitard et al 
(2004) it may compose 2-39% of the value of industrial land.  In Sindh stamp duty for the transfer of property is 3% 
and a fee on mortgage registration is 0.2%. (World Bank et al, 2004; Government of Sindh, 2001).  Stamp duties on 
property transfer, lease and mortgages are less than 0.1% in China, 0.1-0.4% in Philippines, 0.4-4% in Malaysia and 
0.4-3% in Singapore depending on the property value and term of lease (calculated based on Alm et al 2004). 
36
 Punjab Rules on Commercialization of Property – http://www.lda.gop.pk/lda_cmp.html. 
37
 http://www.punjab.gov.pk/hud/PHTA.pdf and http://www.punjab.gov.pk/hud/index.htm.  
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An important related issue is that TMA budgeting is poor, and medium term budgeting (which is 
what you do for programing capital investments) is non-existent. Secondly within TMAs, 
administrations sub-divide their TMA capital budget between union councilors so what is 
provided in the end is piecemeal infrastructure.  In addition, the provincial level zoning and 
building by-laws are inconsistent across authorities resulting in confusion, conflicting policies 
and decisions, and lack of coherent set of city-wide approaches.  This further reinforces the 
piecemeal approach to the area development practice. 
 
99. Administration of zoning, building by-laws (e.g. building heights, FARs, etc.), and building 
approvals are administered by a number of different agencies. For instance, in the case of 
Lahore, these include the Lahore Development Authority (LDA), Cantonment Board, Defense 
Colony and Tehsil Municipal Administrations. (World Bank et al 2004)  The processing of 
applications for site development, approval of related plans, and issuance of associated permits is 
slow and complex, and may take up to a year to complete.  The recent firm survey in Pakistan 
(the Administrative and Regulatory Costs Survey; FIAS, 2005) revealed that 61 percent of 
respondents are hiring agents to assist them in obtaining site development permits and 57 percent 
reported paying bribes to expedite the process. The process requires submission of 61 documents 
and costs Rs 569,000 (US$9,810
38
) on average, including Rs 220,000 (US$ 3,800) in bribes. 
Obtaining building approval in Lahore may involve up to 18 different intermediate approvals and 
permits. Site inspections are conducted and development permits issued by numerous authorities. 
Between site inspections and development permits, a builder/developer could reportedly 
interface with as many as 15-25 authorities depending on the specific location. 
 
The public sector’s response to the affordable housing shortfall has been in ineffective 
 
100. The Government of Punjab appears to be focusing more on the direct provision of 
serviced land through housing development schemes rather than promoting an enabling 
environment that would allow the private sector and individuals to take care of their own needs. 
Unfortunately, public production of residential plots in the Punjab has been minuscule. Presence 
of federal government in housing provision is rather limited.  There appears to be one federal 
housing program implemented by the Pakistan Housing Authority (PHA) in Punjab and 4 
projects are in operation in Lahore providing 1,240 housing units. There are no requirements for 
eligibility under the program. All units are allocated on a ‘first come – first serve’ basis upon 
down-payment (The government of Punjab had allocated Rs 4.1-4.7 billion (US$ 70-78 million), 
or 23-25 percent of its development budget for housing and planning purposes in 2000-02.  
However, the majority of these resources were allocated for planning purposes, while resources 
for low income housing and khaki abadis schemes composed less than 2 percent of the total 
development budget  
 
101. Since 1972, federal, provincial and local production of plots and units totals 215,000 (see 
Table 8). This works out to about 6,500 plot and units per year on average.
39
 At current rates, the 
Punjab Province adds about 110,000 households per year. In the best case, assuming that all plots 
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 Here and further in the text the average 2003 exchange rate of US$ 1 = Rs 58 is used for currency conversions 
unless indicated otherwise. 
39
 However, many of these plots are vacant and lack infrastructure services.  
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are provided with infrastructure, government agencies account for slightly less than 6 percent of 
annual household formation.  
 
102. Punjab appears to have fallen into a common trap of “too much government” in the areas 
of zoning, planning and regulations and “not enough government” in regards of property rights, 
provision of infrastructure and facilitation of the private sector involvement as described by 
Dowall and Clark (1996). Experience so far indicates that this approach has not been very 
successful and has resulted in highly inefficient housing and land markets.  
 
Table 8 
Government Housing Programs in Punjab 
Program No. of areas No. of units Cost (Rs million) 
1. PHA schemes 4 (Lahore) 1,240  
2. 3-marla (75m2) 
housing scheme 
(PHATA) 
22 (19 completed) 13,495  
3. ADS (PHATA) 110 104,818 
completed 
13,922 
4. ADS (LDA) Lahore 88,662**  
5. Katchi Abadis 
Development Program 
29 locations  150 (allocated for 
2002/03) 
6. Housing for Pakistani 
Expatriates* 
9 cities 6,600 Costs – 1,870 
Revenues – 2,637 
7. Housing for the 
Government Servants 
Throughout Punjab, pilot 
in Mohlanwal (Lahore) 
 79 in 2000/01 and 
150 in 2001/02 
* Announced, not implemented yet. 
** LDA has implemented 21 housing schemes that provided 71,258 plots (Word Bank 2004b). 
Source: www.pha.gov.pk and www.punjab.gov.pk 
 
103. In order to better assess the effectiveness, costs and benefits of the different programs 
more information is needed. However, experience in other countries indicates that public housing 
and land development, and slum up-grading programs are generally less effective in addressing 
housing and land shortages than elimination of the numerous restrictions on the housing and land 
markets (Bertaud 1989). 
 
104. Furthermore, a number of studies40 show that in-kind subsidies such as allocation of land 
and housing at sub-market prices and provision of free infrastructure introduce large 
inefficiencies because usually the value of the asset to the recipient is lower than the cost of its 
provision to the government.  This results in strong incentives for speculation and resale of 
property. The extent of the inefficiencies is closely related to the size of the subsidy and 
elasticity of housing substitution for other goods, and was estimated by Aaron and von 
Furstenberg (1971) at 8-60 percent depending on the size of the subsidy. At the same time 
limiting the occurrence of resale usually requires extensive and costly government controls.   
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 Aaron and von Furstenberg (1971), Bradford and Shaviro (1999), Friedman and Weinberg (1982). 
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105. In-kind subsidies such as subsidized low income housing projects also tend to reduce 
residential mobility of the poor as the subsidy is tied to the location (Bertaud, 2004). While well 
designed government assistance would be necessary to ensure adequate housing supply for low 
income groups, addressing the policy constraints is crucial for the market to be able to cater to 
the needs of the higher and middle income groups.  A detailed analysis of the costs and benefits 
to the developers and buyers in Malaysia showed that the costs imposed by regulatory constraints 
by far outweighed the benefits of land and tax subsidies.
41
  As a result, the increasing demand 
caused increase in prices rather than supply. 
 
106. Based on the experience so far and the ever increasing demand for housing and 
developed urban land it is clear that the government will not be able to address the needs through 
direct interventions in the market and other means will be necessary. One of the important 
aspects is facilitation of greater involvement of private industry. Therefore, understanding the 
regulatory constraints to more robust private sector engagement in real estate development is a 
critical part of the analysis.  
 
                                                 
41
 For detailed analysis see Malpezzi and Mayo (1997), Bertaud and Malpezzi (1994) and World Bank (1989a). 
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Recommendations 
 
107. The key conclusion of the study is that increasing urbanization and economic 
development are imposing ever greater pressures on the housing and land markets in Punjab.  
However, the observable market characteristics such as rapidly rising property prices and 
housing expenditures, large informal settlements, limited investment in housing and small formal 
mortgage markets indicate significant potential distortions.  This Background Study has 
pinpointed a range of impediments, including:  excessive public land ownership, inadequate 
infrastructure services, weak property rights, counterproductive urban planning policies and 
regulations, costly subdivision and construction regulations, limited financing for property 
development and acquisition, rent controls and distortive taxation mechanisms. In this section we 
outline a range of recommendations for improving urban land and housing market performance.  
 
108. Our recommended approach is based on the notion that the reform agenda should be 
comprehensive, and coherently link together the full range of needed actions. As demonstrated 
by Galal and Razzaz (2001) the absence of a comprehensive approach or a “road map” to guide 
the design of reforms often produces reforms that focus too narrowly on a single issue such as 
land registration, mortgage finance or slum regularization.  While such reforms provide positive 
results, their impact and sustainability can be undermined by distortions in other areas.  Thus, 
achievement of desired benefits and more efficient housing and land markets require a 
comprehensive approach to the reforms.  However, since it is not possible to launch all reforms 
at the same time, prioritization and sequencing are important.  Furthermore, “successful 
implementation requires more than just issuing new laws or regulations. It requires changes in 
incentives, institutions and behaviors.” (Galal and Razzaz, 2001)  Furthermore, any reforms 
require political commitment.  Some are quicker and easier and some are more longer term and 
require preparatory steps. 
 
 
Recommendation 1: Build an urban information base and deepen understanding of urban 
land and property market dynamics. 
 
The reform agenda must be guided by sound and accurate information on the 
patterns of urban land development, land prices, land supply, number of housing 
units built (both formal and informal), rents and their trends (including residential 
and non-residential), data on current and future development projects. Economic 
and demographic surveys and studies are needed to make projections of future 
urban growth and resulting land market requirements. Dowall (1995) provides a 
detailed framework for such a land market assessment. 
 
Availability of good market information would also provide great benefits for the 
property developers.  For example, the results of a land market assessment in 
Bangkok (Dowall, 1995) in 1987 revealed that low cost housing units had much 
higher demand than the overall housing market.  As a result, developers realized 
the potential profitability in this market segment. 
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Recommendation 2: Strengthen property rights and improve efficiency of land titling and 
registration.  
 
With respect to the formal sector, reform initiatives should focus on closing 
loopholes in the property registration, including elimination of legal protection of 
unrecorded transactions; reorganizing property registration system to ensure 
effective protection of property rights – up-dating records, merging and 
computerizing databases; and streamlining the interface with the public – 
establishing easy access to “one-stop-shops” for obtaining information on 
property rights. 
 
For informal areas with problematic land rights and titles, a comprehensive 
approach to regularizing informal settlements should be framed. A number of 
countries have successfully introduced different instruments with varying degrees 
of tenure security.  Those can be in the form of legally recognized rights of use 
provided to the squatter and slum dwellers, while the ownership of the land stays 
with the original owner (e.g.  Certificates of Rights in Botswana and Concession 
of the Real Right to Use in Brazil).  Another approach is provision of titles 
through a separate dedicated mechanism as was the case under COFOPRI 
program in Peru, where one million titles were issued to residents of informal 
settlements over 5 year period. (GPA, 2001). 
 
 
Recommendation 3: Reform and restructure systems of local property taxation to reduce 
distortions and to strengthen resource mobilization. 
 
The current asymmetry between local resources and local infrastructure and urban 
service requirements is enormous and must be corrected.  Reforms are needed to 
improve the efficacy and efficiency of property tax mechanisms and government 
should look for alternative tools for financing infrastructure and urban service 
delivery.  
 
 
Recommendation 4: Reform urban planning, zoning, subdivision and construction regulations 
to encourage sound economic development of cities and more affordable housing production. 
 
First and foremost, urban master plans and zoning ordinances need to be revised 
to better align urban land supply with market demands. Plans should be developed 
based on more careful and rigorous analysis of future development trends.  
Assessed through market studies rather than perceived “need” based on 
demographic trends.  This would allow planners to explicitly consider economic 
as well as social, environmental and physical implications of alternative master 
plans and zoning. 
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Second, floor area ratios and other development controls should be reviewed and 
revised and include increasing the FARs, particularly towards the CBD. 
 
Third, reforms should include reviews of   existing planning and subdivision 
standards and building codes and making required adjustments to ensure their 
affordability, while taking into consideration social and environmental aspects. 
 
 
Recommendation 5: Reform  rent control.  
 
It may vary from a ‘shock therapy’ of elimination of all rent controls at once to a 
gradual deregulation through exemption of new construction, more frequent and 
more market led rent increases and other measures.  This may also entail the 
replacement of rent control with well targeted housing subsidies such as housing 
allowances, vouchers, etc., which have been applied in the USA, Chile, Armenia, 
Latvia and other countries 
 
 
Recommendation 6: Reduce levels of public land ownership through auctions and use 
proceeds to finance critical infrastructure and engage in a reform of public land development 
agencies.  
 
An initial step would be to conduct a comprehensive survey of public land 
ownership in Punjabi cities. Holdings should be evaluated for potential 
development. High value sites should be auctioned off and the proceeds used to 
finance infrastructure.  
 
At the same time, the Government of Punjab should undertake a through 
assessment of the   performance of public land development agencies and 
undertaking the necessary adjustments.  Those may include restructuring, full or 
partial privatization, liquidation of agencies as well as auctioning of public land 
holdings and concentrating on provision of infrastructure.
42
 
 
 
Recommendation 7: Increase investment in infrastructure systems and build institutional base 
for economically and financial sustainable system of infrastructure delivery, operations and 
maintenance.   
 
Based on new master plans and economic development strategies, Punjabi cities 
should develop capital investment plans for infrastructure projects. These plans 
should also include business plans for operating and maintaining systems as well 
as recovering capital costs.  
 
A collateral activity will be to identify and design new financing mechanisms for 
paying for new infrastructure.  These mechanisms might include reforming 
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property taxation to align it with actual property values; and introducing   
development impact or and betterment fees as well as other land value capture 
instruments. 
 
 
Recommendation 8: Encourage more private sector participation in real estate development 
and the financing of real estate.  
 
The Punjab needs to increase the involvement of the private sector in land and real estate 
development and provision of infrastructure. This will require regulatory reforms, 
enhanced access to real estate finance, and access to land for real estate development, 
training and professional development.   
 
 
Recommendation 9: Design new institutional frameworks for managing urban development at 
the local, city and metropolitan levels.  
 
An overall assessment of the current institutional and organization framework for 
land and housing and devolving land management should be undertaken and 
reforms made to improve coordination and effectiveness at local, city and 
metropolitan levels of governments. 
 
 
109. As the governments of Pakistan and Punjab focus attention on the looming challenges 
posed by rapid urban development, reform efforts should be closely coordinated at the central, 
provincial and local levels of government.  Governments at all levels should focus on the 
establishment of an enabling environment through strengthening the legal framework, 
particularly, for property rights, modernizing its planning, zoning and construction regulations 
and approaches, withdrawal from direct interventions in the market and facilitating greater 
involvement of the private sector. 
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